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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATfri OF" UTAH 
SHIRLEY BERUBE, 
P1aint iff-Appellant, 
FASHION CENTRE, LTD., dba 
FASHION GAL OF OGDEN, 
JOSEPH E. TORMAN dba WESTERN 
STATES POLYGRAPH ard jriHw *n/ 
JANE DOES 1-10, 
Def endants-Re spo ndents. * 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Plaintiff Shirley Berube in her Notice of Appeal raised a 
host nil' issues whish she eiairs-^ ?r< * - -\neal.n r s rt 
Pi aint i£ t Ber ube, i n tie i b r. J e J 
to three major areas: (1) Whether * iot sue IF .-r.r.\.ex . 
n n w t: [" i a I I y i oimqfu 1 d i s r.'s '?' c l a i m * ' v n e r n e : . * **~w 
Judge Wahlquist" a deniaJ si p 
complaint to include a cause « r i;r i • IO Ldr. «xj-
§^4-"17-I in Utah code Annotates: , u . -< ^ ^ded . was a 
prejudicial error, ( ,J j hlht/i . / 
granted sammary judgment on plaint itr' - nee 2 gent 1epiesentation 
C «*- f" ' • *: " .,011. 
Since no other issues were discussed by Plaintiff Berube in 
her brief on appeal, the respondent Fashion Centre, Ltd., dba 
Fashion Gal of Ogden (hereinafter referred to as "Fashion Gal"), 
accepts Plaintiff Berube's dismissal of the appeal with respect 
to those issues. Fashion Gal shall therefore respond only to the 
issues presented by appellant's brief and will deem those to be 
the sole issues to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Plaintiff Shirley Berube (probably through a clerical error) 
has misstated §34-37-16, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
The correct text of the statute is as follows: 
Surreptitious examinations prohibited. It 
shall be a violation of this act to 
conduct a deception detection examination 
by instrument without the physical 
presence of the subject and through a 
surreptitious manner where a subject is 
not aware of the examination. 
Furthermore, it shall be unlawful for: 
(1) any deception detection examination to 
be conducted by instrument by out-of-state 
examiners through telephonic means to 
anyone in Utah or for Utah examiners to 
use telephonic means to determine truth or 
deception; or (2) refusal to submit to 
such examination to be the basis for 
denying or terminating employment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent-defendant Fashion Gal seeks a ruling of this 
Court affirming the rulings of Judge Wahlquist, Judge Hyde and 
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Judge Roth of the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber 
County, dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff Shirley Berube was an employee "at-will" of 
the defendant Fashion Centre, Ltd., dba Fashion Gal of Ogden. 
(This at-will relationship has been conceded by plaintiff in her 
brief, see p. 27 of Appellant's Brief, and see R. p. 449 last 
paragraph of Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for New Trial). As such, there was no 
anticipation for continuity or longevity of employment by either 
party. ( R. 923). Plaintiff Berube further testified that she 
could quit her employment anytime she wished. (R. 80, Berube 
depo, p. 30, line 12-25 and R. 722, line 10-19). 
Plaintiff Berube was also aware that certain acts on the job 
were not allowed and certain requirements might be requested as 
part of her "at-will employment." (R. 714, line 2-6). Part of 
this procedure was outlined in Fashion Gal's disciplinary action 
Release 620-04 which states as follows: 
An employee may be terminated without 
prior warning for the following reasons: 
(a) Insubordination; (b) dishonesty; (c) 
disloyalty (i.e., disclosing privileged 
company information); (d) falsification of 
company records; (e) destruction of 
company property; (f) gross negligence; 
(g) refusal to take a polygraph test; (h) 
failure to pass a polygraph test; (i) 
gross misconduct. 
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Miss Berube knew when she was hired, throughout her employment, 
and immediately before she refused to take the polygraph test 
that she would be immediately terminated if she ever refused to 
take a polygraph test. (See R. 714, also see Berube depo, R. 80, 
p. 34, 57, 58). 
Miss Berube had a history of polygraph testing difficulties 
which she was aware of but which she refused to advise any of the 
defendants in this case of. (See R.80 Berube depo, p. 7 8-79) 
She had previously taken several polygraph tests in succession 
and because of her nervous nature failed to pass or failed to 
give an accurate reading as to her truth and voracity. (See R. 
80, Berube depo, p. 78-79; also see R. 623-24). 
Fashion Gal is in the business of retail sales for women's 
apparel. One of the major problems associated with retail sales 
is employee theft of inventory. During the third and fourth 
quarters of 1981 Fashion Gal operated a store in North Ogden in 
which Shirley Berube was an employee. (R.80 Berube depo, 
p.40-41). This store showed a significant increase in inventory 
shortages during that period. In conformcince with Fashion Gal's 
general policy, all employees were sent to independent 
polygraphers for testing. (R. 80, Berube depo, 51-52). Miss 
Berube felt this request was reasonable and warranted in light of 
the high increases of the shortages. (See R. 80, Berube depo, 
p. 51) . 
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Fashion Gal is not in the business of deception detection 
nor do they have the means to determine whether or not employees 
are telling the truth. (R. 875, 876). Therefore, they hired 
Western States Polygraph to perform the test. Western States 
Polygraph is licensed by the Utah State Department of Business 
Regulations and according to all information available to Fashion 
Gal were reputable polygraphers. (See R. 769). Fashion Gal has 
no expertise or ability to perform deceptive detection tests and, 
therefore, relied upon Western States Polygraph for their 
independent expertise and independent judgment. (See R. 212). 
Fashion Gal did supply questions for Western States for the 
purpose of defining areas that need to be covered. It was fully 
expected by Fashion Gal that Western States would conduct a 
legally adequate test and cover the areas of concern. 
After Miss Berube took the polygraph test from Western States 
Polygraph, Fashion Gal received by mail two documents as to the 
results. (R. 767). The first document was a letter dated March 
15, 1982 from Western States Polygraph to Fashion Gal which 
stated: 
Subject showed deception on the question, 
'Do you know for certain who has cheated 
or stolen anything from Fashion Gal?1 
(See R. 352, Exhibit IIP). 
The second page received by Fashion Gal was a document 
entitled "Consent to Polygraph Test." This document was dated 
March 8, 1982 and signed by Shirley Berube which stated: 
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I fully understand that the results of the 
test and the examiners conclusions may be 
unfavorable to me. I hereby forever 
release and discharge Western States 
Polygraph and Apparel Industries, Inc. and 
its affiliated companies, including 
Fashion Centre, Ltd., dba Fashion Gal, and 
their directors, officers and employees 
from any and all claims, suits, causes of 
action, demands and liabilities which I 
have or may have resulting directly or 
indirectly from my agreement to take the 
test, from my taking the test, from the 
results of the test, and from any 
conclusions or opinions drawn by the 
examiner. (See R. p. 352, Exhibit 5P, p. 
24) . 
In the retail industry, generally, and with Fashion Gal, it 
is very important that all employees are completely honest and 
loyal in their dealings with the company. (R. 614, 616). Since 
Ms. Berube showed deception concerning her knowledge of other 
employees1 dishonesty, it was requested that she be retested. 
(Any deception at all on these tests was deemed by Fashion Gal to 
be a failure of the test. (R. 926). Ms. Berube could have been 
discharged at this point. Rather than discharge Ms. Berube, she 
was given a second chance to prove her honesty and voracity with 
the company). 
The second test was requested by Fashion Gal and taken by 
Berube and in that test she admitted to falsifying company 
documents. See Record p. 352, Exhibit 5P p. 25 wherein it 
states: 
She has from time to time, when making out 
the company paperwork, rounded off a few 
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unitsf if she thought the employee's count 
was off. 
With Ms. Berubefs admissions of the second test, and the 
deception showed in the first test, it was determined that a 
third test would be required to give her the opportunity to 
explain the other test discrepancies. (See R. 924, 925). On 
advice from her uncle, her brother, her sister, and a friend and 
fellow employee Marilyn Chase, Ms. Berube refused to take the 
third polyqraph test. (See R. 927, 971). At the time Ms. Berube 
refused to take the test she knew that her refusal would result 
in immediate termination. (See R. 80, Berube depo, p. 34, 57, 
58). The test was scheduled for April 28, 1982, and because of 
the refusal Plaintiff Berube was terminated in accordance with 
the policies of Fashion Gal, "Refusal to take Polygraph", 
(see R. 213). 
After her termination * Ms. Berube made several attempts to 
get her job back and wrote several letters requesting rehire. 
(See R. 352. Exhibit 4P; R. 352, Exhibit 5P pp. 29. 30). 
Specifically, in Ms. Berubefs May 6, 1983 letter to Fashion Gal 
she states: 
My decision was a very foolish mistake, 
one I will regret the rest of my life. I 
could not make up my mind, so with other 
employees tellinq me not to take the third 
poly, I refused without using my own 
judgment. I only blame myself to listen 
to other people. 
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Stating further: 
I would be grateful for another chance if 
the company gave me one. I would not let 
you down again. I have learned by my 
mistakes. (See R. 711). 
Thereafter, plaintiff filed this action seeking, 
among other things, damages for wrongful discharge. 
Plaintiff Berube, in her brief, has represented several 
facts that are not borne out in the record or that need to be 
clarified. They are as follows: 
1. On Page 7 of Appellant's Brief, third paragraph, 
plaintiff represented that she was informed by the examiner that 
she had indeed passed the examination. This testimony was 
objected to on the grounds of hearsay and the Court allowed it in 
only for the limited purpose of explaining her response. At no 
time was this information ever communicated to the defendant 
Fashion Gal and, in fact, the only two documents which 
constituted all of the communication between Fashion Gal and 
Western States Polygraph concerning the Berube test were the 
March 15, 1982 letter and the Consent and Release form. (R. 
641-42, 767, 786) . 
2. Plaintiff Berube represents on Page 7, paragraph 4, of 
her brief that the test given by Western States Polygraph was a 
prohibited test by State polygraph regulations. They cite solely 
for this indication an affidavit submitted by David C. Rankin. 
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No proper foundation was laid for the affidavit nor was the 
actual State regulation (if it exists) ever produced. Mr. 
Rankin's affidavit was totally conclusory in nature and did not 
contain any backup information. Furthermore, Fashion Gal had no 
expertise in polygraph testing and that is the reason that they 
hired the independent services of Western States Polygraph. (R. 
212, 213). Fashion Gal had no control over Western States 
Polygraph, nor did they dictate how the test should be operated 
or supervised and, therefore, cannot be held responsible for any 
acts of Western States Polygraph. 
3. Plaintiff represents on Page 8 of her brief: 
Fashion Centre was acutely aware of what 
the employee had passed since they 
designed and supplied the questions used 
in the polygraph examination. 
While it is true that Fashion Gal did provide a list of relevant 
questions to Western States Polygraph/ Fashion Gal was not 
provided with Exhibit 12P which showed which questions were in 
fact asked to Shirley Berube and which showed the answers and 
test results. Fashion Gal was only provided with the March 15 
letter, Exhibit IIP and the Consent and Release form previously 
signed by Shirley Berube, Exhibit 5Pf p. 24. (R. 767, 786). 
4. Plaintiff Berube makes a distinction as to whether or 
not the test showed deception vs. deception on one question. The 
test was specfically given to Ms. Berube in order to try to 
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explain inventory shortages. The question which she showed 
deception on was one which specifically went to inventory 
shortages. The fact that she showed deception on one question in 
Fashion Gal's interpretation meant that she had failed the test. 
Honesty and voracity are the main reasons for giving the 
polygraph test. (R. 926). The actual answers received, although 
important in determining the basis for such inventory losses, are 
not the main thrust of the test. The main thrust is to determine 
whether or not the employee is being completely honest in their 
dealings with the company. (R. 926-927). 
5. On Page 11 of Plaintiff's Brief, the first full 
sentence, she seems to indicate that she requested to reschedule 
the test before she was terminated. This is not supported by the 
record and, in fact, it was only after she was advised that she 
was terminated and was coming in to pick up her termination 
papers that she made any request whatsoever to have the test 
rescheduled. (R. 710). Ms. Berube further testified that she 
knew when she refused to take the test that she would be 
terminated. Furthermore, on Page 11, second full paragraph, 
plaintiff intimates that the District Manager, Mr. Wilson, had 
told her she could get her job back. No conversations were ever 
held with Mr. Wilson with reference to reinstatement at the time 
of the termination. It was represented that a Mr. Brooks had 
said that the company might possibly reconsider but it would have 
to be submitted to the St. Louis Office. (R. 711-712). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE, UNDER UTAH LAW, HAS 
NO CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION. 
Plaintiff Berube has conceded throughout the trial of this 
matter and throughout this appeal that she was a "at-will 
employee." (See p. 27 of Appellant's Brief; R. 449). With such 
concession. Plaintiff Berube has admitted that there is no other 
evidence which would create either expressly or impliedly a 
stipulation as to the duration of her employment with Fashion 
Gal. (This also was the finding of the jury.) In fact, she had 
admitted in her testimony that she could quit at any time and 
that she had no specific expectation of continued employment. 
Plaintiff has cited numerous cases which state that there 
may be some express or implied condition between the employer and 
the employee which would make the employment arrangement not an 
at-will situation. Plaintiff has misconstrued these cases as 
saying that an employee may be an at-will employee and still have 
some express or implied stipulation as to duration of employment. 
This is a mischaracterization as to the cases in that they 
specifically determine that if an employee is truly an at-will 
employee he has no cause of action for wrongful discharge. But 
if the employee can submit information which would create either 
expressly or impliedly a stipulation as to the duration of 
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employment/ then he is no longer an at-will employee and may have 
a cause of action for wrongful discharge. Since plaintiff has 
conceded that she was an at-will employee/ she has further 
conceded that no express or implied stipulation exists as to 
duration of employment. (And in fact none existed.) This Court 
must therefore follow the law as set forth in the case of 
Bihlmaier v. Carsonf 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979)f wherein the Court 
stated as follows: 
The general rule concerning personal 
employment contracts isr in the absence of 
some further express or implied 
stipulation as to the duration of the 
employment or of a good consideration in 
addition to the services contracted to be 
rendered/ the contract is no more than an 
indefinite general hiring which is 
terminable at the will of either party. 
Seey Bihlmaier p. 792. 
Since plaintiff has conceded that she was an at-will 
employee/ that issue is resolved. 
The Supreme Court in Bihlmaier further went on to say: 
When an individual is hired for an 
indefinite timef he has no right of action 
against his employer for breach of the 
employment contract upon being discharged. 
See/ Bihlmaier/ i.d. 792. 
Although Utah has recognized that the implied covenant of 
good faith is inherent in all contract dealings (see cases cited 
by plaintiff on p. 22 of her brief)r this Court has never 
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recognized an independent cause of action for breach of an 
implied covenant of qood faith absent an obligation or duty. The 
good faith issue is considered when an issue of performance 
related to a contract is raised. (fiee* fteck v. Farmer's 
Insurance Exchange, 12 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3). Since plaintiff has 
conceded that she was an "at-will employee," she has also 
conceded that she could be terminated at any time with or without 
cause and would not have a cause of action for wrongful 
discharge. See, Bihlmaier v. Carson> 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 
1979); Kelly v. Western Airlines, Inc., 115 LRRM 2110. 2111 
(BNA)(D. Utah 1983); Amos v. Corporation of the President, 594 
F.Supp. 791, 829-830 (D. Utah 1984). 
Plaintiff urges this Court to adopt an independent separate 
cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith. 
Althouqh in some instances that may be advisable, it is totally 
without merit when considered with the facts of this case. 
Plaintiff's basic cause of action was plead pursuant to her 
Amended Complaint under terms of wronqful discharge. All damages 
submitted by plaintiff were related solely to her ability to 
collect income from her job with Fashion Gal. Since she was an 
"at-will employee" she could have been terminated at any time 
with or without cause. Therefore, it follows that she can 
establish no causal relationship from the breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith without a contractual breach with her loss 
13 
of income from her job because she could have been terminated for 
no reason at all/ i.e., lay-offs, reduction in force, or closure 
of the store. (R. 922) . Since she could be discharged at any 
time, there is no way she can accurately reflect the amount of 
income that she would have received had she not been terminated 
for refusing to take a polygraph examination. Plaintiff failed 
to submit any credible evidence as to damages that would 
rightfully flow from the alleged breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith, so she should not be entitled to have a new trial 
on that issue. (Atkins, Wright & Mills v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., Ut. Adv. Rep., p. 20, No. 18232 filed 
Oct. 22, 1985). (In Atkins, the court held that to establish 
damages, a party must prove two points: [11 The fact of 
damages; and [2] Amount of damages.) 
Even if this Court should go beyond the law enunciated in 
this state and recognize a wrongful discharge cause of action, 
plaintiff, because of her own actions, cannot support such a 
claim. Plaintiff submits in support of this position Fashion 
Gal's Disciplinary Action handout. No. 620-04. The plaintiff has 
correctly cited the purpose of the document, "to equitably and 
constructively handle situations involving disciplinary action 
which may result in dismissal of an employee." It has never been 
intimated, nor asserted by plaintiff, that this disciplinary 
action procedure outline precluded the company from terminating 
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employees at any time without cause. In fact, the only evidence 
before the Court was that Shirley Berube, plaintiff, could quit 
at any time she wished and that the defendant Fashion Gal could 
terminate Shirley Berube without cause if they deemed fit. (R. 
92?). Disciplinary Action Procedure Guideline 620-04 was to be 
used only in situations involving disciplinary action. (R. 871, 
921, 923). Both employee Shirley Berube and employer Fashion Gal 
knew that she could be terminated at any time without cause if 
the company saw fit. Similar facts were submitted in the case of 
Held v- American Linen Supply, 6 0.2d 106. 307 p.2d 210 (1957). 
Plaintiff has mistakenly cited this case as stating thatf 
"express contractual provisions added to the at-will employment 
contract." (Appellant's brief, p. 20). This is not what the 
Court held or inferred. The Court specfically said that 
"A general contractor of hiring is ordinarily deemed a contract 
terminable at the will of either the employer or empoyee." 
(Held 6 U.2d 106 at 109). The Court did recognize that in some 
situations an at-will employment agreement may be transformed 
into a contract other than at-will, if express or implied 
conditions exist which will take the arrangement out of the 
"at-will employment" arrangement. A cause of action may then 
exist, but if there is no express provision nor any provision in 
the agreement from which it should be implied that the company's 
right to discharge an employee was limited to a discharge for 
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just cause, then no cause of action for wrongful discharge 
exists. See, Held v. American Linen Supply, id., at 110, 
The facts of this case show that Fashion Gal terminated 
Shirley Berube for refusal to take a third polygraph examination. 
This was grounds for termination without prior warning. 
Plaintiff Berube had been aware of this policy from the date she 
was first employed up through her employment and was fully 
cognizant of the policy when she made the concious decision to 
refuse to take the test. She also knew that she would be 
terminated by refusing to take the test. 
Several jurisdictions have recognized the employers right to 
terminate employees for refusing to take polygraph tests. See, 
Smith v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 370 So.2d 283 (Ala. 1984); 
Larson v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Az. 507, 573 P.2d 907 {1911)} 
Ising v. Barnes Hospital, So.W.2d , 116 LRRN 3140 (BNA) 
(Mo. App. 1984) . 
Plaintiff Berube has spent a considerable amount of time 
discussing cases which talk about express or implied stipulations 
as to the duration of employment taking the case out of an 
employment at-will situation and putting it in an employment 
contract situation with some duration of time expressed. The 
defendant Fashion Gal would submit that these cases are 
irrelevant to this Court's determination of the wrongful 
discharge claim because plaintiff has conceded that she was an 
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"at-will employee11. It is clear that the disciplinary action 
Document 620-04 submitted by plaintiff as Exhibit IP does not 
create the express or implied condition referred to by the Utah 
Supreme Court. (see specifically Held v. American Linen Supply 
Co,, supra). Therefore, this Court should uphold the jury 
verdict decided in the Second Judicial District Court in and for 
Weber County dismissinq plaintiff Shirley Berube's complaint for 
wrongful discharge. 
POINT II 
THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS 
TO THE LAW AND PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO 
PROPERLY OBJECT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS AND 
SPECIAL VERDICT OR PROVIDE THE COURT WITH 
ANY ALTERNATIVES. 
With reference to plaintiff's wrongful termination charge, 
the Court gave instructions No. 15 and 16. (^ ee R. 337, 338). 
Jury Instruction No. 15 was substantially the same instruction 
that plaintiffs had prepared and given to the Court as applying 
the law in the state of Utah. Althouqh defendants objected to 
this instruction (See R. 977) the Court gave the instructions 
substantially as plaintiffs had prepared it. The plaintiffs 
provided no other instructions to the Court, nor did they object 
to these instructions as given. The Utah Supreme Court has 
specifically held in the case of Snyderville Transportation Co, 
Inc. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 at p. 942 (1980): 
Under Utah law, a party on appeal may not 
assign as error either the giving or 
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failure to give an instruction unless he 
first proposes correct instructions, and 
should the Court fail to give them, to 
then except thereto. 
Plaintiffs in this case did not propose any additional 
instructions at the time the matter was to be presented to the 
jury and in fact the court gave all of plaintiff's requested 
instructions. All of plaintiff's proposed instructions are 
found in the record at pages 372 throuqh 395. The only other 
two instructions that they proposed to the court are found in 
the record in the manilla packet listed as Record 81. These two 
instructions were given by the court. (R. 974). 
The only objection that plaintiffs voiced was that they 
thouqht that the wrongful termination claim should go to the 
jury on a two-pronged theory. (R. 980). At no time did the 
plaintiffs submit an instruction as to such, nor after the 
instructions were given, did they except thereto. Specificallyr 
if the plaintiffs wished the matter to be submitted on a 
two-pronged theory. they should have requested that the special 
interrogatories or special verdict form be changed. When the 
court questioned plaintiff's counsel as to the adequacy of the 
special verdict form, plaintiffs raised no objection at all. 
(R. 983, lines 3-6). 
Plaintiff relies upon the theory of the "law of the case" 
that Judge Hyde's ruling mandated the issues that Judge Roth 
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could submit to the jury. Judge Roth did not agree with 
plaintiff's counsel's interpretation of the ruling. A careful 
reading of the ruling and a review of the circumstances which 
brought forth the ruling would support Judge Roth's position. 
Plaintiffs have stated that, "On December 7, 1984, the cross 
motions for summary judgment filed by the parties came before the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde." (See p. 27, appellant's brief). This 
statement is misleading because, although there were two motions 
for summary judgment filed, there was no motion filed by the 
plaintiffs for any ruling from the court. The two motions for 
summary judgment were filed by both the defendants in the case. 
Therefore, they were not cross motions, but independent similar 
motions. The judge's ruling on the defendant Fashion Gal's 
motion is as follows: 
As to the counts for "wrongful termination 
and breach of implied condition of 
employment contract" and wrongful 
discharge (tort), the question herein 
basically appears to be whether or not the 
policy manual is the "express or implied" 
exception to the "at-will" rulesf together 
with the question of good faith and fair 
dealing. Viewing the matter in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, it 
appears there may be a genuine issue of 
material fact sufficient to warrant trial. 
Defendant's Motion for Summay Jugment on 
these counts is denied. 
(R. 290-291). 
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The formal order signed by the courtf dated January 2, 1985, 
and found in the record on pages 302-304 determined that, 
"Therefore, more evidence needs to be submitted on this matter, 
and therefore. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on these 
counts is denied." The plaintiff had not submitted any motionf 
nor requested any ruling from the court narrowing the issues. 
The court's ruling denied the Motion for Summary Judgment and held 
that material fact issues needed to be determined. Fashion Gal 
herein asserts that Judge Roth was correct in requiring that the 
plaintiff still had the burden of proof and the burden to go 
forward with the evidence. There was no ruling sumitted by the 
court which either limited the proof necessary to prove the 
allegations complained of in the Amended Complaint, nor did away 
with the necessity of any proof at all. 
Plaintiffs further allege that unusual and compelling 
circumstances exist to allow the court to ignore plaintiff's 
failure to object to the requested instructions and failure to 
provide what they view as correct instructions, and remand this 
case for a new trial. This would be totally unfair, unjust, and 
against the law as it applies in this state. (See State of Utah 
v. Kendall, 438 P.2d 178 (Ut. 1968) at p. 180. See also, E.A. 
Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foye & Sons, Inc., 665 
P.2d 1320.) The burden, as established in the Strout case, has 
not been met by the plaintiff's counsel. Their obligation to 
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object or except was clear, and by their failure to exercise such 
obligation they have waived it. 
Even if the Court accepts plaintiff's counsel's argument that 
there are compelling reasons to allow them to raise their first 
objection to the instructions and special verdict form here on 
appeal, the facts of the case as presented at trial do not warrant 
such application. Plaintiff Berube was terminated for failing to 
follow company policy. (Larson v. Motor Supply Co., 523 P.2d 907 
(Az. 1977) She knew at the time that she made the decision not to 
take the third polygraph test that she would be terminated. 
Defendant Fashion Gal had good reason to request that she take 
such test, i.e., failure of the first test and violation of 
company policies made known through truthful answers on the second 
test. Plaintiff Berube was not singled out. Other employees were 
also terminated for refusing to take tests. Defendant Fashion Gal 
has felt throughout all of their dealings with Ms. Berube that 
they treated her in good faith and allowed her every opportunity 
to prove herself. In this particular case the defendant Berube 
had control of her own destiny. It was her own actions which lost 
her her job, not the bad faith actions of any person at Fashion 
Gal. Berube has even acknowledged this fact several times to 
defendant Fashion Gal. (See Record 352, Exhibit 5P, p. 29-30) 
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POINT III 
JUDGE WAHLQUIST'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON §34-37-16, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED (1953, AS AMENDED), WAS 
CORRECT BECAUSE THE PARTIES STIPULATED 
THAT "THE DEFENDANT DID NOT REQUEST A 
DECEPTION DETECTION EXAMINATION BY 
INSTRUMENT WITHOUT THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE 
OF THE SUBJECT OR ONE THROUGH A 
SURREPTITIOUS MANNER WHERE THE SUBJECT 
IS NOT AWARE OF THE EXAMINATION." 
§34-37-16, "Sureptitious Examinations Prohibited" reads as 
follows: 
Surreptitious examinations prohibited. It shall be a 
violation of this act to conduct a deception detection 
examination by instrument without the physical 
presence of the subject and through a surreptitious 
manner where a subject is not aware of the 
examination. Furthermore, it shall be unlawful for: 
(1) any deception detection examination to be 
conducted by instrument by out-of-state examiners 
through telephonic means to anyone in Utah or for Utah 
examiners to use telephonic means to determine truth 
or deception; or (2) refusal to submit to such 
examination to be the basis for denying or terminating 
employment. 
This statute on its face is clear and unambiguous. It 
applies solely to the deception detection examinations by 
instrument without the physical presence of the subject and 
through a surreptitious manner where a subject is not aware of 
the examination. (This position was adopted by the Attorney 
General of the State of Utah. [See Exhibit Af Informal Opinion 
No. 81-80, attached hereto]). 
Subsection 2 of the statute refers to "such examinations". 
Under its clear and literal meaning "such examination" can only 
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refer to the examinations referred to in the previous part of the 
section. 
Since the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, 
there is no purpose nor any legal reason for this Court to look 
at legislative intent. (Matheson v. Crockett 527 p.2d 948 (Ot. 
1978); State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911 (Ut. 1979). The intent 
of the statute is clear from its literal meaning. When Judge 
Wahlquist ruled on the motion of plaintiff to amend her complaint 
he had before him the statute in question. After reading the 
statute* he questioned the parties as to whether or not anyone 
was claiming that a deception detection examination by instrument 
without the physical presence of the subject had been used or 
through a surreptitious manner where a subject is not aware of 
the examination. It was stipulated at the hearinq that this type 
of examination was not requested of plaintiff Shirley Berube. 
Based upon that stipulation the Court ruled that this Section was 
not applicable to the case at hand and, thereforef refused to 
allow the plaintiff to submit any evidence with regard to that 
claimed cause of action. (R. 101-103) 
Plaintiff's interpretation of the statute would be unfair 
and unjust because the statute's clear language would not put an 
employer on notice that polygraphs performed by licensed 
individuals would be prohibited. The statute clearly only 
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prohibits the use of deception detection examination by 
instrument without the physical presence of the subject and 
throuqh a surreptitious manner where the subject is not aware of 
the examination. We would concede that such examinations would 
be in violation of the deception detection examiners act. Any 
other interpretation of the statute requires a complete rewriting 
of the statute by this court. It is not the prerogative of this 
Court to rewrite the statute to give it new meaning. (See 73 Am 
Jur 2d- Statutes §197 p. 393-94 (1974). 
Since the statute is clear on its facer legislative intent 
does not need to be looked into and the Court can interpret the 
literal meaning of the words contained therein and should 
therefore uphold Judge Wahlquist's denial of plaintiff's motion 
to amend her complaint to include a cause of action under that 
statute. No such cause of action exists. 
Even if the Court were to determine that it was unlawful for 
any employer to deny or terminate employment because of a refusal 
to submit to any deception detection examination, the Court must 
determine that the statute creates no civil right of action for 
such violation of the statute. Specifically, the penalty is 
provided for in §34-37-13, wherein it states, "Any person 
violating this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 
Plaintiff's only recourse in alleging a violation of §34-37-16, 
is to file a misdemeanor charge with the County Attorney of Weber 
County. 
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Furthermore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this 
issue because Plaintiff Berube failed to preserve her right to 
appeal by timely filing a notice of intent to appeal, which was 
required by 72(a) Rules of Civil Procedure (Utah 1984); Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Ut. 1982). 
Since no private right of action exists and plaintiff 
stipulated that no such surreptitious examination was involved in 
this case, the Court should affirm Judge Wahlquist's order 
denying plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. 
POINT IV 
JUDGE HYDE CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENT CAUSE OF 
ACTION BECAUSE THE ALLEGATIONS AS 
ENUMERATED IN HER COMPLAINT DID NOT (1) 
ALLEGE A CAUSE OF ACTION OF NEGLIGENCE 
AGAINST FASHION GAL; (2) DEFENDANT FASHION 
GAL WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN RESPECT TO THE 
POLYGRAPH TEST ALLEGED THEREIN; (3) 
PLAINTIFF CONSENTED TO THE POLYGRAPH TEST 
AND THE COMMUNICATION OF THE RESULTS 
THEREOF; AND (4) PLAINTIFF RELEASED 
DEFENDANT FASHION CENTRE, LTD. FROM ALL 
CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF THE POLYGRAPH TEST. 
(A) NO ALLEGATIONS OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION WERE 
INCLUDED IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT FASHION GAL. 
In Count I, entitled "Negligent Misrepresentation of 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint" (See R. 86-99, specifically p. 
91), the plaintiff lists her allegations. The only allegation 
against Fashion Gal is listed in Paragraph 26 which states: 
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Upon receipt of the information, Fashion 
Gal failed to exercise reasonable care and 
competence in neglecting to determine the 
standards employed by Western and arriving 
at Western's conclusions by utilizing its 
own sources for inquiry and investigation. 
This allegation is not sufficient to support a claim for 
negligent misrepresentation. The tort of negligent 
misrepresentation has been defined by the Supreme Court of Utah 
as follows: 
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest 
in a transaction, (2) is in a superior 
position to know material facts, and (3) 
carelessly or negligently makes a false 
representation concerning them, (4) 
expecting the other party to rely and act 
thereon, and (5) the otner party 
reasonably does so act, (6) suffers loss 
in that transaction, the representor can 
be held responsible if the other elements 
of fraud are also present. 
Christensen v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 
302, at 305 (Utah 1983). See also, Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 
18 U.2d 378, 381, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967). 
In this action, plaintiff has not alleged a cause of action 
of negligent misrepresentation against the defendant Fashion Gal 
and, therefore, Judge Hyde's ruling was correct. 
(B) DEFENDANT FASHION GAL WAS NOT NEGLIGENT WITH RESPECT TO 
THE POLYGRAPH TEST ALLEGED IN COUNT I OF PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED 
COMPLAINT. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that: 
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In an action for negligence, the Court 
determines (a) whether the evidence as to 
the facts makes an issue upon which the 
jury may reasonably find the existence or 
non-existence of such facts; (b) whether 
such facts give rise to any legal duty on 
the part of the defendant,... 
Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76, 78 (Utah 1977), quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, §328B (1965). 
The Supreme Court in Gray further stated: 
It is the further function of the court to 
determine whether, upon facts in evidence 
which the jury may reasonably find to be 
true, the law imposes upon the defendant 
any legal duty to act or to refrain from 
acting for the protection of the 
plaintiff. This decision is always for 
the court. 
Gray v. Scott, supra, 565 P.2d at 78. 
In this case, no Utah Statute, administrative regulation, or 
judicial decision required the defendant Fashion Gal to, 
"determine the standards employed by Western in arriving at 
Western's conclusion by utilizing its own source for inquiring 
and investigation." (See allegation in Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint). Hence, plaintiff has not alleged a cause of action 
of negligence against the defendant Fashion Gal. 
Even if the Court finds that a duty did exist, it is clear 
that the defendant Fashion Gal was not negligent. Defendant 
Fashion Gal was not licensed by the State of Utah to administer 
polygraph examinations and did not consider itself qualified to 
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administer polygraph examinations. Fashion Gal, therefore* chose 
western States Polygraph and their examiner, Steven Taylor, both 
of whom were duly licensed under the Utah Deception Detection 
Examiners Act- ntah Code §34-37-1, et seq., to administer a 
polygraph test to plaintiff on March 8, 1982. 
As licensed polygraphers, defendants Western states and 
Taylor had been found by the Utah Department of Public Safety, 
the aqency charged with licensinq deception-detection examiners, 
to be qualified to conduct a polygraph examination and interpret 
the results obtained for the purpose of deception detection. 
Defendant Fashion ^al relied upon the report issued by those 
licensed polygraphers that plaintiff "showed deception" durinq 
the polygraph test which is the subject of Count I of plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. Because defendant Fashion Gal was not 
licensed to administer polygraph examinations and to interpret 
the results obtained for the purpose of deception detection, the 
reliance upon the report of defendant Western States Polygraph by 
defendant Fashion Gal was clearly reasonable. 
In any event, defendant Fashion Gal did not discharge 
plaintiff for her failure to pass the polygraph test administered 
to her on March 8. 1982. Instead, defendant Fashion Gal asked 
plaintiff to submit to a second polygraph test in order to qive 
plaintiff an opportunity to clear herself of any deception. 
Plaintiff could have been terminated immediately for failing a 
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polygraph. It is thus inconceivable that the action of defendant 
Fashion Gal could be considered negligent with respect to the 
administration of the polygraph test given by Western States 
Polygraph on March 8, 1982, or the interpretation of the results 
obtained for the purpose of deception detection. In short, 
defendant Fashion Gal was not negligent as alleged in Count I of 
plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Judge Hyde's ruling dismissing 
that Count was correct. 
(C) PLAINTIFF CONSENTED TO THE POLYGRAPH TEST ALLEGED IN 
COUNT I AND THE COMMUNICATION OF THE RESULTS THEREOF. 
It is well settled that one who effectively consents to 
conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot 
recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm 
resulting from it. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §892A (1979). 
In the instant case, plaintiff prior to the administration 
of the polygraph test that is the subject of Count I of the 
Amended Complaintf signed a form entitled "Consent to Polygraph 
Test" in which she stated in part: 
If Shirley Berube, consent to take a 
polygraph (lie detector) test to be given 
to me by Western States Polygraph. I 
further consent and agree that Western 
States Polygraph may reveal the results of 
and conclusions drawn from the test to 
Apparel Industriesf Inc.f or any of its 
affiliated companies, including Fashion 
Centre, Ltd., dba Fashion Gal. 
I am giving my consent voluntarily. No 
one has threatened me or forced me to 
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consent/ and no one has made any promise 
of any kind to me in return from my 
consent. 
Having consented to the administration of a polygraph test 
given by Western States and the communication of the results of 
and conclusions drawn from the polygraph test by Western States 
Polygraph to the defendant Fashion Gal, plaintiff cannot recover 
in a tort action for the conduct or for harm resulting from a 
polygraph test. 
(D) PLAINTIFF RELEASED DEFENDANT FASHION GAL FROM ALL 
CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF THE POLYGRAPH TEST. 
A cause of action for damages is barred by a release. 
Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 1982). In 
Horgan the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed a summary judgment in 
favor of an employer in an action for damages brought by a former 
employee, on the basis of a release executed by the employee. In 
the instant case, prior to the administration of the polygraph 
test that is the subject of Count I of plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint, plaintiff executed a form entitled "Consent to 
Polygraph Test" which states in part as follows: 
I fully understand that the result of the 
test and the examiner's conclusions may be 
unfavorable to me. I hereby forever 
release and discharge Western States 
Polygraph and Apparel Industries, Inc., 
and its affiliated companies, including 
Fashion Centre, Ltd., dba Fashion Gal, and 
their directors, officers and employees 
from any and all claims, suits, causes of 
action, demands and liabilities which I 
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have or may have resulting directly or 
indirectly from my agreement to take the 
test, from my taking the test, from the 
results of the test, and from any 
conclusions or opinions drawn by the 
examiner. 
Having released defendant Fashion Gal from any claim arising 
out of the polygraph test that is the subject of Count I of the 
Amended Complaint, Count I is barred to the extent it purports to 
state a claim against defendant Fashion Gal. Accordingly, Judge 
Hyde's granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I was 
correct and should be affirmed by this Court. 
Plaintiffs assert that the remaining issue that is 
controlling is proximate cause. The issue that needs to be 
examined is not proximate cause but whether or not any duty 
existed in the beginning. If there was a duty, whether or not 
the evidence presented by the plaintiffs through their pleadings 
or through affidavit was sufficient to rise to the level of 
materiality to create a question of fact as to the duty, then the 
issue of negligence and proximate cause could be submitted to the 
jury. Since plaintifffs negligent misrepresentation claim was 
insufficiently plead, and no duty existed, the Court was correct 
in granting summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has conceded that she was an "at-will" employee. 
With such concession, plaintiff has also conceded that there are 
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no express or implied stipulations as to the duration of 
employment or of a good consideration in addition to the services 
contracted to be rendered which would take the relationship out 
of the "at-will" arrangement. Since plaintiff was an "at-will" 
employee- no cause of action for wrongful discharge can be had. 
Plaintiff's "at-will" status is exactly what the iury found. The 
court properly instructed the jury as to Utah law, and plaintiff 
made no appropriate objections. 
Furthermore, plaintiff's reliance upon the implied covenant 
of qood faith is misplaced in this action because they can show 
no damages which result from any breach of such implied covenant. 
Plaintiff's claim for violation of §34-37-16 was properly 
excluded because no private right of action exists for such 
violation and plaintiff stipulated that no such surreptitious 
examination was involved in this case. 
Plaintiff's claim for negligent misrepresentation was 
appropriately dismissed because no allegations were submitted 
which would support a cause of action as required by the Utah 
Supreme Court, nor does a duty exist on behalf of Fashion Gal to 
monitor* supervise or control independent polygraph examiners. 
Furthermore. no facts were adduced by plaintiffs which showed 
that any negligence existed on behalf of Fashion Gal. 
Therefore, the defendant Fashion Centre, Ltd., dba Fashion 
Gal of Oqden. respectfully requests that this court affirm all of 
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the rulings of the Second Judicial District Court in and for 
Weber County, and dismiss plaintiff's appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 day of November, 1985, 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
>0RE E. KANEBL THEODC 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Fashion Centre, Ltd. 
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
• DAVID L. WILKINSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
S T J V T E O F U T A H • PAULM. TINKER 
STATE CAPITOL S A L T L A K E CITY e<4II«4 DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
(SOI) 533-5261 
November 4, 1981 
Commissioner Larry E. Lunnen 
Department of Public Safety 
317 State Office Building 
BUILDING MAIL 
Dear Commissioner Lunnen: 
RE: Interpretation of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 34-37-16 (1981 Supp.), Deception 
Detection Examiners Act 
Informal Opinion No. 81-80 
You have requested us to give you an interpretation 
as to the scope and meaning of a portion of Section 34-37-16, 
U.C.A., 1953. This section provides that: 
It shall be a violation of this act 
to conduct a deception detection 
examination by instrument without the 
physical presence of the subject and 
through a surreptitious manner where a 
subject is not aware of the examination. 
Furthermore/ it shall be unlawful for: 
(1) any deception detection examination 
to be conducted by instrument by out-of-
state examiners through telephonic means 
to anyone in Utah or for Utah examiners 
to use telephonic means to determine 
truth or deception; or (2) refusal to 
submit to such examination to be the 
basis for denying or terminating 
employment (emphasis added). 
Exhibit "A" 
Commissoner Lunnen 
Page Two 
November 4, 1981 
You wish to know whether the last clause refers to 
telephonic voice stress examination only or to all deception 
detection examinations including both voice stress 
examinations and polygraph examinations. 
It is quite clear that the clause applies to voice 
stress examinations carried out through a surreptitious manner 
or by instrument where the subject is not present. The first 
sentence of the section clearly prohibits this practice and 
the last clause refers to the subject matter preceeding the 
clause. It therefore prohibits use of refusal to submit to 
deception detection examination by telephonic means as a basis 
for denying or terminating employment. It is not clear 
whether "such examination" means "telephonic voice stress 
examination" or "voice stress examination" or merely 
"examination." 
Since the first sentence prohibits examination 
without the physical presence of the subject, it apparently 
does not apply to the polygraph. The writer cannot see any 
possible way to conduct a polygraph examination without the 
physical presence of the subject. It could be concluded from 
this construction, coupled with the telephone prohibition, 
that the entire section refers only to voice stress 
examination. 
It appears that the Legislature intended it to be 
unlawful to terminate employment for refusal to submit to any 
voice stress examination since telephonic tests are prohibited 
and the first sentence cannnot reasonably be construed to 
refer to a polygraph examination because the subject must 
necessarily be present and aware that the test is being 
conducted. The writer has found no Utah cases or statutes 
dealing with the use of deception detection devices in the 
employment context. (The Utah criminal cases, as you know, 
are in the context of whether or not polygraph examinations 
can be admitted in evidence and hold that such may be the case 
only if the parties have so stipulated (See, for example, 
State v. Collins, 612 P.2d 775, and State v. Able, 600 P.2d 
994) .) 
It would appear that the Legislature might wish to 
examine the problem of the use of all types of deception 
detection devices including polygraph examination in 
employment situations and balance the conflicting claims of 
the employer and employee; however, this statute does not have 
such a broad effect because the statutory prohibition in 
Commissioner Lunnen 
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subsection (2) is narrowly limited, as noted above, to 
telephonic or other types of surreptitious examinations when 
the subject is not physically present. 
The telephonic restriction applies to both public 
and private employment. 
No opinion is intended to be expressed as to 
whether an employer might require an employee, as a contracted 
condition of employment, to submit to deception detection 
examinations (other than by telephonic means or in the 
physical absence of the employee), nor the related questions 
of whether such examinations might be held to violate an 
employee's right to privacy, or violate the employee's right 
to property in cases in which employment may be considered to 
be a property right, or violate the employee's right against 
self-incrimination. 
Sincerely yours, 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
RNP/sp 
NOTE: In conformity with the Attorney General's internal 
policy on opinions, this informal (letter) opinion 
does not deal with issues of such broad public import 
that it would justify detailed scrutiny by the Attorney 
General himself or official publication in the manner 
of a formal opinion. Nevertheless, it is authoritative 
for the purposes of the person requesting it and, with 
respect to the specific question presented, represents 
the position of the Attorney General as expressed 
through his designated staff member. 
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